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ABSTRACT
The performance of private gradient-based optimization algorithms is highly dependent on the choice
of step size (or learning rate) which often requires non-trivial amount of tuning. In this paper,
we introduce a stochastic variant of classic backtracking line search algorithm that satisfies Rényi
differential privacy. Specifically, the proposed algorithm uses the Armijo line search to adaptively
choose step size and to effectively adjust per-iteration privacy budget according to the reliability
of noisy gradient. A naive implementation of the backtracking search algorithm may end up using
unacceptably large privacy budget as the ability of adaptive step size selection comes at the cost
of extra function evaluations. The proposed algorithm avoids this problem by using the sparse
vector technique combined with the recent privacy amplification lemma. We also introduce a privacy
budget adaptation strategy in which the algorithm adaptively increases the budget when it detects
that directions pointed by consecutive gradients are drastically different. Extensive experiments on
both convex and non-convex problems show that the adaptively chosen step sizes allow the proposed
algorithm to efficiently use the privacy budget and show competitive performance against existing
private optimizers.
Keywords differential privacy · stochastic gradient descent · line search · privacy budget adaptation
1 Introduction
We consider solving the following finite-sum optimization problem under differential privacy [1–3]:
arg min
w∈Θ
F (w;D) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
f(w;di) , (1)
where D = {d1, . . . ,dn} is i.i.d. examples drawn from an unknown distribution and f represents the loss on one
training example. This formulation includes a wide range of machine learning problems, for example, training a neural
network with weights w for classification. Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) has been widely used, especially for
large-scale problems, to solve the problem of form (1) due to its simplicity and low iteration cost. For differential
privacy, the SGD update typically has the form of: wt+1 = wt − ηt (gt + Y (t)), where ηt > 0 is a step size, Y is a
noise (e.g., Gaussian) variable whose scale is determined by the per-iteration privacy budget t, and gt is the gradient
evaluated on a subset Bt ⊆ D of examples selected for iteration t: gt = 1|Bt|
∑
di∈Bt ∇f(wt;di).
Despite its prevalent use in differentially private optimization, the use of SGD in practice faces two major challenges.
First, the direction pointed by the stochastic gradient gt may not be a descent one. Even worse, the update direction may
still not be a descent direction even when gt is a descent one, depending on the magnitude of noise Y (t). A natural
question is how to decide whether the privacy budget t is sufficiently large enough to get the learning signal, i.e., gt is
not dominated by Y (t). Second, the efficiency of SGD largely relies on the choice of step size ηt. It can be chosen
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independent of data, e.g., a constant step size [4, 5]. However, these step sizes are often problem-specific and require a
degree of fine-tuning. Data-dependent step sizes [6] requires extra privacy budget and efficiently controlling its change.
In this work, we propose a Rényi differentially private backtracking line search algorithm that adaptively sets the
step size using the Armijo condition and empirically show that it can improve the performance of algorithm on both
convex and non-convex problems. Armijo line search [7, 8] is a classical technique to find a step size η that gives
sufficient reduction in the objective function f . Recently, [9] introduced a stochastic version in which both objectives
and gradients are approximated using a random subset of data. To be specific, it uses backtracking algorithm to find the
step size η that satisfies
fB(wt − η∇fB(wt)) ≤ fB(wt)− αη‖∇fB(wt)‖22 , (2)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is a hyperparameter and fB(·) denotes that f is evaluated on the minibatch B. A naive privatization
of this search algorithm may require unacceptably large privacy budget as it requires multiple function evaluations
on the dataset. Motivated by the observation that the Armijo line search sequentially evaluates threshold queries
q(η) = f(wt) − f(wt − η∇f(wt)) − αη‖∇f(wt)‖22 ≥ 0 for different values of η, the proposed algorithm adopts
the Sparse Vector technique [2, 10], which allows the algorithm to pay the privacy budget only for η that satisfies the
condition. Applying the sparse vector algorithm on a randomly subsampled data further allows the algorithm to relax
the budget constraint using the recent privacy amplification results [11]. While in a deterministic (i.e., noise-free)
setting, it is guaranteed that there exists η that satisfies the condition (2), in a stochastic private setting, the backtracking
algorithm may fail to terminate or return a too small step size due to the noise from two different sources: (i) gradient
approximation and (ii) noise added for privacy. When the backtracking algorithm fails to return within the pre-specified
number of iterations, to decide whether more accurate gradients are necessary, the proposed algorithm evaluates another
gradient at wt and measure the angle between two gradients. When two gradients evaluated at wt are pointing very
different directions, the algorithm increases the privacy budget for gradient evaluation.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose a Rényi differentially private SGD with Armijo line search. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
private SGD algorithm with line search ability.
• We introduce an adaptive privacy budget controlling strategy based on the moving average of angles between
consecutive gradients, which detects if gradients are pointing to very different directions.
• To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, we conduct extensive experiments on real datasets and
compare its performance to existing algorithms.
The rest of this paper are organized as: Section 2 reviews the related work; Section 3 summarizes important definitions
and lemmas used in the paper; Section 4 presents the main algorithm; and experimental results are presented in Section
5; Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
Many techniques have been proposed for first-order optimization algorithms in non-private setting, focusing on step
size selection or reducing the noise involved in stochastic gradients, such as Adam [12], SVRG [13], SplitSGD [14], etc.
The technique related to this paper is Amijo line search [7], which is a classic and famous step size selection approach.
A recent work [9] has shown that, combining SGD with line-search achieves fast convergence for both convex and
non-convex functions, and robust to the precise choices of hyper-parameters, for over-parameterized models, with the
price of additional objective evaluation (feed-forward steps for neural networks). In this paper, we show that with
essential randomization techniques, it can fit into the privacy framework.
Aside from optimization, many other differentially private statistics releasing methods were proposed. One advanced
tool highly related to our paper is the sparse vector technique (SVT) [2], which is based on the Laplace mechanism, used
to achieve a controlled level of privacy for multiple data-dependent queries. Through limiting the released information,
it spends privacy budget independent from size of queries. Although [10] demonstrates that many extensions of SVT
are not private, it also showed the correctness of the original version (used in our approach), further confirmed in [15].
Differentially private optimization algorithms can be roughly grouped into three categories. Output perturbation
algorithms train a model without noisy perturbation, then perturb the model before releasing, based on a calculation of
sensitivity, such as [16–19]. Objective perturbation algorithms protect the privacy of the training data through optimizing
a noise-perturbed objective, for example, [16, 20]. The aforementioned algorithms usually put strict assumptions on the
objective functions, such as convexity and smoothness, which limits their applicable domain. The type of algorithms
mostly related to this paper is the gradient perturbation algorithms, which perturb the data-dependent intermediate
results (i.e. gradients) during the model training, and the total privacy is calculated by compositing the privacy costs of
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all iterations. Since privacy is achieved immediately after the data-dependent step, gradient perturbation algorithms
do not put strict assumptions on the objective function, and can be applied in a broader range of problems, such as
neural networks. The first gradient perturbation algorithm was proposed in [4], with the “strong composition” method
to account for the privacy loss over multiple iterations. Later, “moment accountant” method [5] gave a tighter bound on
privacy amplification and accountant. These algorithms directly satisfies (, δ)-differential privacy, and many algorithms
are build based on them, such as [21, 22]. These algorithms take gradient calculation as the only data-dependent
procedure, thus there is no extra source of information which can be used to adaptively tune hyperparameters such
as step size, per-iteration privacy budget, and/or clipping threshold. [6] is an exception, which proposed an adaptive
gradient perturbation algorithm based on full gradient descent, with extra budget paid for objective evaluation, and it
satisfies zCDP, without privacy amplification.
Rényi differential privacy (RDP) is a recent privacy framework proposed in [3], which stands between pure and
approximate DP, and its privacy amplification lemma is presented in [11]. The privacy guarantee of our algorithm fits
into the RDP framework, and we show that it can help account for the two sources of privacy leaks. This differs from
the “moment accountant” technique, which only accounts for Gaussian perturbations, and also different from the zCDP
framework, which does not yet have privacy amplification of sub-sampling.
3 Preliminaries
Two datasets D and D′ are considered to be neighboring if they differ by one individual, i.e., |(D \D′)∪ (D′ \D)| = 1,
denoted by D ∼ D′. We use bold-face letters to represent vectors and a subscript to indicate iteration number (e.g. wt
denotes the value of w at iteration t).
Differential privacy is a de facto standard for protecting the privacy of individuals in sensitive datasets.
Definition 1 ((, δ)-Differential Privacy (DP)). [1] [23] Given privacy parameters  ≥ 0, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, a randomized
mechanism M satisfies (, δ)-DP if for every event S ⊆ range(M), and for every pair of neighboring datasets
D ∼ D′,
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[M(D′) ∈ S] + δ (3)
When δ = 0, it is called pure DP and when δ > 0, it is referred to as approximate DP. Rényi Differential Privacy (RDP)
is a relaxation of pure-DP and tracks privacy leakage of data access using Rényi divergence:
Definition 2 (Rényi Divergence). For probability distributions P (x) and Q(x) over a set Ω, and let α ∈ (1,+∞).
Then Rényi α-divergence Dα[P (x)‖Q(x)] := 1α−1 log
[
P (x)αQ(x)1−α
]
, where P (x) and Q(x) are pdf (or pmf) of
the distributions, and α is the order of the divergence.
Definition 3 ((α, )-Rényi Differential Privacy (RDP)). [3] Given a real number α ∈ (1,+∞) and privacy parameter
 ≥ 0, a randomized mechanismM satisfies (α, )-RDP if for every pair of neighboring datasets D ∼ D′, the Rényi
α-divergence betweenM(D) andM(D′) satisfies Dα[M(D)‖M(D′)] ≤ 
When α = +∞, (α, )-RDP coincides with (, 0)-DP. The privacy guarantee of RDP can be converted to and interpreted
in terms of (, δ)-DP using the following result.
Proposition 1 (RDP to (, δ)-DP). [3] IfM satisfies (α, )-RDP, then it satisfies ((δ), δ)-DP for (δ) ≥ + log(1/δ)α−1 .
One method to achieve RDP is through the Gaussian mechanism, which scales noise to the L2 sensitivity of a query.
Definition 4 (L1 (resp. L2) Sensitivity). Let q : Dn → Rk be a vector-valued function over datasets. The L1 (resp.
L2) sensitivity of q, denoted as ∆1(q) (resp. ∆2(q)), is defined as ∆r(q) = supD∼D′ ‖q(D) − q(D′)‖r, for r = 1
(resp. 2).
Lemma 1 (Gaussian Mechanism). [3] Let q : Dn → Rk be a vector-valued function over datasets. LetM be a
mechanism releasing q(D) + γ where γ ∼ N (0, σ2Ik), thenM is (α, (α))-RDP for (α) = α∆22(q)/(2σ2).
Gaussian mechanism ensuresM to satisfy (α, αρ)-RDP for α > 1, where ρ := ∆22(q)/(2σ2) can be considered as a
“privacy budget” independent of α.
Other important lemmas about RDP include:
Lemma 2 (-DP to RDP). [24] IfM satisfies -DP, then the Rényi divergence Dα[M(D)‖M(D′)] ≤ 12α2. In other
words,M also satisfies (α, 12α2)-RDP.
Lemma 3 (Private composition for RDP). [3] For mechanismsM1 andM2 applied on dataset D, ifM1 satisfies
(α, 1)-RDP and M2 satisfies (α, 2)-RDP, thenM1 ◦M2 satisfies (α, 1 + 2)-RDP.
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Lemma 4 (Subsampled Mechanism and Privacy Amplification for RDP). [11] For a randomized mechanismM
and a dataset D, defineM◦ POISSON SUBSAMPLE as (i) sample a subset B ⊆ D, as B = {di|ιi = 1, i ∈ [n]} by
sampling ιi ∼ Bernoulli(q) independently for i ∈ [n]; (ii) applyM on B. Then ifM satisfies (α, (α))-RDP with
respect to B,M ◦ POISSON SUBSAMPLE satisfies (α, ′(α))-RDP with respect to D for any integer α ≥ 2, where
′(α) ≤ 1α−1 log
{
(1− q)α−1(αq − q + 1) + (α2)q2(1− q)α−2e(2) + 3∑αl=3 (αl)ql(1− q)α−le(l−1)(l)}.
The Sparse Vector is a technique used to answer a sequence of threshold queries {qi}, i = 1, 2, · · · . Given a publicly
known threshold T , it sequentially processes each qi and produces an output ai ∈ {>,⊥}. Each ai indicates whether
qi(D) is above or below the threshold. It terminates after outputting the predefined number c of “>” values, and its
privacy cost is proportional to c. In other words, given a fixed privacy budget, it can release binary answers to threshold
queries until it outputs c “above” threshold answers (>) regardless of how many “below” threshold answers (⊥) are
generated. ABOVETHRESHOLD is a basic version with c = 1.
Lemma 5 (Above Threshold Mechanism). [2] Let {qi} = q1, q2, ... be a series of queries having the same L1
sensitivity ∆1(q), and T be a publicly known threshold. The ABOVETHRESHOLD algorithm first perturbs T by adding
Laplace noise, i.e, Tˆ = T + λ where λ ∼ Lap(0, 2∆1(q) ) and generates output {ai} as follows.
ai =
{
> if qi(D) + νi ≥ Tˆ ,
⊥ if qi(D) + νi < Tˆ ,
where νi ∼ Lap(0, 4∆1(q) ). The mechanism terminates if ai = >. The ABOVETHRESHOLD satisfies (, 0)-DP.
4 Algorithms
This section describes each component of the proposed algorithm in detail. Proofs are deferred to the appendices.
4.1 Noisy Backtracking Line Search
We start with NOISYBTLS algorithm which performs backtracking line search in a differentially private manner. The
pseudocode of the algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. NOISYBTLS is an application of ABOVETHRESHOLD algorithm,
introduced in Lemma 5, to a line search task. We propose a Laplace version and a Gaussian version.
Algorithm 1 Noisy Backtracking Line Search (NOISYBTLS), Laplace [resp. Gaussian] version
1: Input: Objective function f , dataset D, model w, candidate gradient g, initial learning rate η0, privacy parameters
1, 2 [resp. noisy scales σ21 , σ
2
2], query sensitivity ∆q .
2: Hyper-parameters: α, β, maximum iterations max_it.
3: Initialize Sample noisy threshold Tˆ = λ, where λ ∼ Lap(0, ∆q1 ) [resp. λ ∼ N (0,∆2qσ21)]
4: η ← η0
5: for i = 1, 2, . . . , max_it do
6: qi ← f(w;D)− αη‖g‖22 − f(w − ηg;D)
7: qˆi ← qi + νi where νi ∼ Lap(0, ∆q2 ) [resp. νi ∼ N (0,∆2qσ22)]
8: if qˆi ≥ Tˆ then
9: Output: η . found a suitable step size
10: η ← βη
11: Output: 0 . failed to find η within max_it iterations
The algorithm starts by adding noise to the threshold T = 0, producing a noisy threshold Tˆ = λ, where λ is a
random noise drawn from a Laplace or Gaussian distribution. At each iteration, the algorithm evaluates a query
qi(η,D) = f(w) − f(w − η∇f(w)) − αη‖∇f(w)‖22 with noise νi and compares it (i.e., qi(η,D) + νi) with the
noisy threshold Tˆ . If qi(η,D) + νi ≥ Tˆ , the algorithm outputs η and halts. Otherwise, it decreases the step size η by
multiplying with β and continues with the next iteration. Here, β ∈ (0, 1) is a user-defined multiplicative factor that
determines how fast the step size is decreased. One difference with the original ABOVETHRESHOLD algorithm is that
we set a limit on the number of iterations. Otherwise, when the query value is dominated by noise, it would fail to
terminate or returns a too small step size which does not help make progress. Hence, when the algorithm fails to return
within the specified maximum number of iterations, the algorithm computes a diagnostic statistic to test whether higher
privacy budget is necessary. We discuss details of this procedure in Section 4.2. The use of Sparse Vector technique in
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Algorithm 1 significantly reduces the privacy budget needed to find η, from a scale linear to the size of the search space
to a constant, which greatly improves its utility. A naive implementation would result in (1 + max_it · 2, 0)-DP.
Theorem 1. Let ∆f be an upper bound on the objective function f such that |f(w;d)| ≤ ∆f for ∀d ∈ D and
w ∈ Θ. Given the candidate gradient g either privately released or publicly available, Algorithm 1 with Laplace noise,
1 =

2 , 2 =

4 , and ∆q = ∆f satisfies (, 0)-DP.
Theorem 1 requires f is upper bounded by a constant ∆f . In general, there is no a priori known upper bound on a
loss function f . To satisfy the condition, we enforce the bound by applying the objective clipping [6]: f(w;D) =∑n
i=1 min {f(w;di), ∆f}. Since the Laplace version of Algorithm 1 is -DP, one can use Lemma 2 to convert its
privacy guarantee to that of RDP. But we show that there is a tighter bound of privacy for NOISYBTLS:
Theorem 2. Under the same conditions of Theorem 1, the Laplace version of Algorithm 1 is (α, (α))-RDP, for
(α) = 1α−1 log
{[
α
2α−1 exp
(
1(α− 1)
)
+ α−12α−1 exp
(− 1α)] · [ α2α−1 exp (22(α− 1))+ α−12α−1 exp (− 22α)]}
And in the following theorem, we show that Algorithm 1 with Gaussian noise also satisfies RDP:
Theorem 3. Under the same conditions of Theorem 1, the Gaussian version of Algorithm 1 is (α, (α))-RDP, for
(α) = α(4σ21 + σ
2
2)/2σ
2
1σ
2
2
One can easily verify that, running Laplace version of NOISYBTLS with 1 ← /2, 2 ← /4, or Gaussian version
of NOISYBTLS with σ21 ← 3/(2ρ), σ22 ← 3/ρ would satisfy (α, (α))-RDP for (α) given by Theorem 2 or 3,
respectively.
4.2 Private Backtracking Line Search Based Stochastic Gradient Descent
Now we present our main algorithm, called Differentially Private Backtracking Line Search-Based Stochastic Gradient
Descent (DP-BLSGD). Algorithm 2 shows the pseudocode.
Algorithm 2 Rényi Differentially Private Backtracking Line Search Based Sub-sampled Gradient Descent (DP-
BLSGD)
1: Input: Dataset D = {d1, ...,dn}, loss function F (w, D); clipping thresholds Cobj , Cgrad; sampling ratio q;
privacy budget for line search BT , privacy budget for gradient ρgrad; budget increase rate ξ, initial learning rate
η0.
2: Initialize w0 randomly. θ ← 90◦.
3: for t = 0, 1, ... do
4: Sample a mini-batch B by sampling ratio q
5: gt ←
∑
di∈B clip(∇fi(wt,di), Cgrad) . see (4)
6: g˜t ← 1|B| (gt + γ), where γ ∼ N (0, (C2grad/2ρgrad)I)
7: η ← 0
8: while η = 0 and budget is not used up do
9: η ← NOISYBTLS(f,B,wt, g˜t, η0, BT )
10: if η > 0 and budget is not used up then
11: wt+1 ← wt − ηg˜t
12: Update θt and θ according to (5)
13: else
14: ρgrad, BT , g˜t ← CHEB(ρgrad, BT , ξ, g˜t)
15: Halt if budget is used up
Starting with initial parameter vector w0, at iteration t, the algorithm evaluates the gradient∇f(wt) over a minibatch
B. To bound the sensitivity, it applies the gradient clipping [5]. Specifically, it computes the per-example gradient
gi = ∇fi(wt,di) for each di ∈ B and applies the clipping function to gi, i.e., clip(gi, Cgrad). The clipping function
is defined as
clip(g, C) =
g
max(1, ‖g‖2/C) . (4)
The application of clipping function in line 5 ensures that the L2 norm of every per-example gradient in the summation
is no greater than the threshold Cgrad, and hence it bounds the L2 sensitivity of summed gradient to Cgrad. After
summing the clipped per-example gradients, it adds Gaussian noise with variance C2grad/2ρgrad to each coordinate.
The step size η for iteration t is computed by calling NOISYBTLS with passing noisy gradient g˜t as input. When the
step size η returned by NOISYBTLS is greater than 0, the algorithm performs SGD update in line 11.
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Privacy budget adaptation When NOISYBTLS fails to find a step size within max_it number of iterations, there
are two possiblities. First, the current privacy budget ρgrad assigned for evaluating the gradient is too small that noise
dominates the gradient. The remedy for this case is to increase the privacy budget. The second possibility is that ρgrad
is large enough not to remove the gradient signal but the current gradient happens to contain larger noise than usual. In
this case, we need a more accurate measurement of gradient. To distinguish these two case, DP-BLSGD keeps track of
angles between two consecutive gradients, and it is updated at every iteration (line 12) as follows:
θt ← ANGLEBETWEEN(g˜t, g˜t−1)
θ ← ψ × θ + (1− ψ)× θt ,
(5)
where ψ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter for decaying old information. Note that θ is initialized to 90◦ for the first iteration and
line 12 is not executed when t = 0. When η = 0 is returned by NOISYBTLS, the algorithm evaluates another gradient
g˜t2 using the budget of ρgrad and measures the angle θ between g˜t and g˜t2 (line 5 in Algorithm 3). If θ is greater than
the moving average-based threshold θmax, the algorithm increases the privacy budget. When θ is smaller than the
minimum threshold θmin, it indicates that the search might fail due to the small privacy budget BTLS assigned for
objective evaluation. Hence, we increase BTLS in this case. The threshold values θmax and θmin are calculated as
follows:
θmax ← φmax × θ , θmin ← φmin × θ , (6)
where φmax > 1 and 0 < φmin < 1 are hyper-parameters. Empirically, we observe this budget adaptation strategy is
especially effective for convex optimization problems.
Algorithm 3 Check and Enlarge Budget for SGD (CHEB)
1: Input: current budget ρgrad, BT , budget increase rate ξ, perturbed gradient g˜t.
2: Sample a mini-batch B by sampling ratio q
3: gt2 ←
∑
di∈B
(∇f(wt;di)/max(1, ‖∇f(wt;di)‖2)Cgrad ))
4: g˜t2 ← 1|B| (gt2 + γ2), where γ2 ∼ N (0, (C2grad/2ρgrad)I)
5: θ ← ANGLEBETWEEN(g˜t, g˜t2)
6: Calculate θmax and θmin . see (6)
7: if g˜t · g˜t2 < 0 or θ > θmax then
8: ρgrad ← (1 + ξ)ρgrad
9: else if θ < θmin then
10: BT ← (1 + ξ)BT
11: g˜t ← (g˜t + g˜t2)/2
12: Output: ρgrad, BT , g˜t
Intelligent backtracking To reduce the number of times the algorithm redundantly backtracks due to unnecessarily
large initial step size η0, NOISYBTLS maintains a list Ω of previously selected step sizes. After every τ iterations, η0 is
updated as η0 ← min{ς ·max{Ω}, η0}, and Ω is reset to an empty set. The parameter ς > 1 guarantees the line search
starts with sufficiently large initial step size but not too large to avoid redundant backtrackings. In our experiments in
Section 5, we set ς = 1.2. Note that, in a non-private setting, the line search algorithm proposed in [9] resets the initial
step size in a similar way, but it simply resets η0 to a multiple of η selected in the previous iteration. However, in a
private setting, this strategy of resetting η0 at every iteration can make the search unstable as step sizes selected by a
noisy backtracking algorithm can fluctuate due to noise.
Theorem 4. Algorithm 2 is (α, )-RDP.
4.3 Clipping Threshold Adaptation
The gradient and objective clipping techniques allow to effectively bound the sensitivity but, if they are used with
incorrectly chosen threshold values, they can degrade the utility. For example, if Cgrad is too high but the norm of
gradient is small, it is likely that the noise dominates the gradient due to high sensitivity. On the other hand, if Cgrad
is too small, then it clips out useful information. During the model training, the norm of gradients decreases as the
parameter vector wt gets closer to the optimal values, and hence a large clipping threshold might not be necessary in
the later stage of training. Motivated by this, we propose to adaptively decrease the clipping threshold Cgrad and Cobj
if the algorithm decides to increase ρgrad (line 8 in Algorithm 3) during a single SGD update. The algorithm decreases
the threshold only once per each SGD update regardless of how many times ρgrad is increased.
Cgrad ← (1− ζ)Cgrad , Cobj ← (1− ζ)Cobj , (7)
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where ζ is a hyperparameter that determines the rate of decrease. The proposed algorithm with the clipping threshold
adaptation is called DP-BLSGD-AC. Note that this strategy does not require any extra privacy budget since the
condition is based on privately released information.
5 Experimental Results
5.1 Models
We run our experiments on two convex problems: logistic regression and linear SVM. Let di = (xi, yi), xi being
attributes and yi ∈ {−1,+1} its label, the objective function of logistic regression is F (w;D) := 1n
∑n
i=1 log(1 +
exp(−yiwTxi)), which is convex and smooth. For SVM, we use the hinge loss, which is convex but non-smooth, and
F (w;D) := 1n
∑n
i=1 max(0, 1− yiwTxi).
We also apply our algorithms on non-convex problems, training neural networks for image classification tasks. We
trained two different architectures: multi-layer perception (MLP) and convolution neural network (CNN). The details of
network architectures are discussed in Section 5.7. To avoid overfitting, we applied a L2 regularization on the model
parameters with a coefficient µ = 0.001 for all models.
5.2 Datasets and Pre-proessing
A summary of all datasets used in our experiments are shown in Table 1. Four census datasets were used for convex
optimization: Adult [25], Bank [26], IPUMS-BR, and IPUMS-US [27]. All categorical attributes are pre-processed by
one-hot encoding, and numeric ones are scaled to [0, 1]. Three datasets were used for training neural networks. MNIST
and Fashion MNIST (FMNIST) contains gray-scale images, and Cifar-10 dataset contains RGB images. Each pixel in
each channel is re-scaled into [-1, 1]. Each experiment was run 5 times and the averaged performances are reported.
Table 1: Summary of datasets
Dataset Size Dimension Baseline
Adult 48,842 124 0.761
Bank 45,211 33 0.883
IPUMS-BR 38,000 53 0.507
IPUMS-US 40,000 58 0.513
MNIST 60,000/10,000 1× 28× 28 ∼0.1
FMNIST 60,000/10,000 1× 28× 28 ∼0.1
Cifar-10 50,000/10,000 3× 32× 32 ∼0.1
MNIST, FMNIST, and Cifar-10 have hold-out portions as testing data; others are trained by 10-fold cross validation.
5.3 Baselines
For convex problems, we compare the performance of our proposed algorithms, DP-BLSGD, DP-BLGD, and DP-
BLSGD-AC, with 8 baseline algorithms: DP-AGD [6], DP-SGD [5], OUTPERT-RSGD [19], OUTPERT-GD [17],
OBJPERT [16, 20], PrivGene [28], MAJORITY, and NON-PRIVATE. DP-AGD is the adaptive full-batch gradient descent
algorithm, which selects step size by NOISYMIN. DP-BLGD is the batch gradient descent version of our DP-BLSGD,
which uses the budget increasing technique of DP-AGD. DP-SGD is the gradient perturbation algorithm presented
in [5]. OUTPERT-RSGD and OUTPERT-GD are both output perturbation algorithms, the former calculates sensitivity
based on permuted SGD with averaging, and the latter calculates sensitivity depending on batch gradient descent.
OBJPERT is the objective perturbation algorithm which inject noise into loss function. PRIVGENE is private model
fitting based on genetic algorithm. NON-PRIVATE is the non-private baseline, which uses L-BFGS to search for an
optimal solution. MAJORITY classifies every sample as the major class.
For neural network models, we compare our algorithms with the gradient perturbation algorithms proposed in [5], which
injects Gaussian noise into the sub-sampled clipped gradients, for both SGD and Adam versions. The NON-PRIVATE
baseline shows the performance of ADAM optimizer.
5.4 Hyperparameter setting
We fix δ = 10−8 for all experiments. For those algorithms satisfying RDP, we choose the best conversion to (, δ)-DP by
Proposition 1. We set the hyperparameters as follows for convex models: to determine the initial privacy budget BTLS
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and ρgrad to achieve some determined (, δ)-DP, we first divide  by 100 as iter = /100, then set BTLS = iter,
ρgrad =
1
2
2
iter. We set sampling rate q = 0.1, set Cgrad = 3 and Cobj = 1 for all gradient perturbation algorithms,
and set ξ = 0.3 to enlarge the noisy budget. We set NOISYBTLS hyperparameters as α = 0.5, β = 0.8, and set
τ = 10, ς = 1.2, φmax = 1.1, φmin = 0.5, and ψ = 0.8. For DP-BLSGD-AC, we set the clipping threshold decrease
rate parameter ζ = 0.05. Hyperparameters of the baseline algorithms are set according to each paper’s suggestions.
For neural network models, we set subsampling rate q = 1/200, Cgrad = 3 and Cobj = 3, and since all private
algorithms are gradient perturbation based, we plot the performance over iterations, and use RDP to composite the
privacy. We set NOISYBTLS hyperparameters α = 0.001 and β = 0.8, since we found that for over-parameterized
models, because the gradients have large norms, smaller α would help fasten training. For DP-ADAM, we use the
default settings. For DP-SGD, after tuning, we set η = 0.2 for MNIST and FMNIST models, and η = 0.1 for Cifar-10
models.
5.5 Effect of Hyperparameters
We evaluate the effect of 6 important hyperparameters of our algorithms: α, β used for backtracking line search, the
mechanism of objective perturbation (Laplace or Gaussian), sampling ratio q, the mechanism of budget allocation for
SGD, and decreasing rate for clipping threshold ζ.
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Figure 1: Hyperparameter Tuning ( :  = 0.2, :  = 0.05)
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Figure 2: Number of gradient and objective evaluations for different sampling ratio at  = 0.4
Figure 1 shows the effect of hyperparameters on the training performance of logistic regression on the Adult dataset
(testing data accuracy). We can see that the algorithm is relatively robust to α and β at  = 0.2 level, while at  = 0.05,
it tends to favor α = 0.5 and β = 0.8. Larger α would make the algorithm tend to choose smaller step sizes, which is
necessary for more noisy gradients (small ). Small β would give the algorithm a large jump of candidate step size each
time, therefore generally β = 0.8 is a suitable choice. Laplace noise for objective perturbation result in slightly better
performance than what Gaussian noise do. When  = 0.2, the algorithm is robust to sampling ratio q, but q cannot be
too small at high privacy level, since gradients calculated on smaller batches are more sensitive to noise perturbation.
Although the performance is similar for stochastic and full gradient descent, as Figure 2 shows, subsampling can greatly
reduce the number of objective and gradient evaluations. For budget allocation mechanisms for SGD, “no” means never
increase budget, “must” means always increase budget regardless of angle measurement, and “adap” means adaptively
increase budget based on angle measurement. We can see the angle measurement is indeed beneficial. It is hard to
determine the effect of adaptively decreasing clipping threshold, since the results show that for  = 0.05, it benefits
the performance, but for  = 0.2 it does not. Therefore in the next section we plot performance of BLSGD with and
without adaptive clipping.
5.6 Performance of Convex Optimization
Figure 3 and Figure 4 plots the testing data accuracy (top) and objective values (bottom) of the algorithms against the
privacy parameter , for logistic regression and SVM, respectively. For the algorithms we proposed, we show results
using Laplace version of NOISYBTLS, since it slightly outperforms the one using Gaussian version. DP-BLSGD,
DP-BLSGD-AC, and its full-batch version (DP-BLGD) outperform the baseline algorithms in most cases. They
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Figure 3: Logistic regression result by  (Top: Classification accuracy; Bottom: Objective value)
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Figure 4: SVM result by  (Top: Classification accuracy; Bottom: Objective value)
outperform the DP-AGD algorithm, which shows that the NOISYBTLS based technique performs better than the
NOISYMIN based step size selection. Since the DP-BLGD applies the same budget increasing mechanism as DP-AGD,
and both algorithms use full gradient descent, it shows that the improvement of DP-BLGD over DP-AGD is a result
of Armijo line search technique. Our algorithms also outperform the state-of-the-art output perturbation algorithm,
OUTPERT-RSGD, on 3 out of 4 datasets. OBJPERT and DP-SGD show low performance when  is small. This
indicates that step size selection and adaptive budget control are useful tools to achieve a high privacy level. The only
exception is the Bank dataset, where OUTPERT-RSGD outperforms ours. But this dataset has very small training
range since the MAJORITY and NON-PRIVATE baselines are very close, which might affect the performance of gradient
perturbation based algorithms. When clipping threshold adaptation is applied (DP-BLSGD-AC), the performance can
be slightly increased in some datasets.
5.7 Performance of Neural Network models
For MLP, we have one hidden layer with 1000 units for MNIST, and 2 hidden layers with 256 units each for FMNIST;
for CNN on MNIST and FMNIST, we stack a convolutional layer with 6 output channels, a max pooling layer, another
convolutional layer with 16 output channels, another max pooling layer, and 2 fully connected layer with width 256
and 128, respectively. For CNN on Cifar-10, we stack a convolutional layer with 32 out channels, another with 64 out
channels, a max-pooling layer, 2 convolutional layers with 128 out channels, a max-pooling layer, 2 convolutional
layers with 256 out channels, a max-pooling layer, and 3 fully connected layers with size 4096, 1024, 512, respectively.
In order for our DP-BLSGD to accumulate privacy parameter  at the same speed with DP-SGD and DP-ADAM,
we set the the NOISYBTLS to return βmax_itη0 instead of 0 if it evaluates over all the max_it candidates. (Thus,
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Figure 5: Neural network model results (Top: Classification Accuracy; Middle: Objective Value; Bottom: Privacy  and
selected step size)
we let our algorithm DP-BLSGD just perform step-size selection, without budget increasing.) We also set the same
per-iteration budget ρiter for three algorithms: for DP-SGD and DP-ADAM, we use ρiter to determine noisy scale
σ2; for DP-BLSGD, we use 10% of ρiter for NOISYBTLS (Gaussian version), and 90% for gradient perturbation.
Therefore, each iteration is (α, αρiter)-RDP for all three algorithms, and it would be a fair comparison of performances
against iterations.
The classification performance for neural network models are shown Figure 5. The bottom row shows the step size
selected by DP-BLSGD. As an expected behavior, it is decreasing during training. DP-BLSGD outperforms DP-SGD
and DP-ADAM in these aspects: For MLP networks, it can reach to a high testing accuracy in less iterations, and
converge to an accuracy similar as other methods. For CNN networks on MNIST and FMNIST, it converges much
faster than DP-SGD and DP-ADAM, and result in lower objective values. On Cifar-10 dataset, although the gap
between non-private and private algorithms is larger, DP-BLSGD still achieves better performance in less iterations
compare to the two private baselines, especially in objective value. Note that, since our DP-BLSGD did not perform
budget increasing for neural network models, it uses the same per-iteration budget across the training as DP-SGD and
DP-ADAM, so our method may still face too noisy gradients in later stage, preventing it from converging to a higher
accuracy. Since neural network models needs much more iterations to train, the privacy leak would accumulates too fast
if we keep increasing per-iteration budget. However, our results show that step-size selection through line search alone
can help increase the performance to a certain level, and accelerate the convergence as well.
6 Conclusions
We presented a Rényi differentially private SGD with adaptive step-size selection and privacy budget adaptation.
Our empirical evaluations on both convex and nonconvex problems demonstrate that classical line search can help
automatically set the step size and improve the utility. We also introduced practical techniques for improving the runtime
adaptivity of private optimization algorithms, which allows the algorithm to accelerate by making quick progresses.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Consider the query qi evaluated on D and q′i evaluated on D
′ where D and D′ differs by one datum d∗:
|qi − q′i|
=|[f(w, D)− αη‖g‖2 − f(w − ηg, D)]
− [f(w, D′)− αη‖g‖2 − f(w − ηg, D′)]|
=|f(w, D)− f(w, D′)− [f(w − ηg, D)− f(w − ηg, D′)]|
=|f(w, d∗)− f(w − ηg, d∗)| ≤ ∆f
The last equality holds regardless of whether D\D′ = {d∗} or D′\D = {d∗}. The last inequality holds since both
f(w, d) and f(w − ηg, d) are non-negative within range [0,∆f ].
Therefore, Algorithm 1 is applying the ABOVETHRESHOLD mechanism (Lemma 5), with q1, q2, ..., each has sensitivity
∆f , comparing f(w, D)− αηi‖g‖2 − f(w − ηig, D) with public threshold T = 0. (Assume there is a dummy query
after qmax_it which always return true.) So, according to Lemma 5, Algorithm 1 is -DP.
B Proof of Theorems 2 and 3
Proof. Let v = (v1, ..., vk) denote the output of the ABOVETHRESHOLD algorithm A, where v1 = ... = vk−1 = ⊥
and vk = >. The threshold is T for each query, and noisy threshold T˜ = T + λ, where λ is a Laplace (or Gaussian)
noise. Let νi, i ∈ [k] be independent Laplace (or Gaussian) noises to perturb each query result qi, i ∈ [k]. For
neighboring datasets D ∼ D′, we have |qi(D)− qi(D′)| ≤ ∆q for i ∈ [k]. Now consider output distributions of A on
D and D′ as P(v, D) and P(v, D′):
P(v;D) = P
[A(D) = v]
=
∫
...
∫ k−1∏
i=1
P
[
qi(D) + νi < T˜ |T˜
]
P
[
qk(D) + νk ≥ T˜ |T˜
]
P
[
T˜ |T ]dν1...dνk dλ
=
∫
...
∫ k−1∏
i=1
1qi(D)+νi<λ1qk(D)+νk≥λ dν1...dνk dλ
=
∫
...
∫ k−1∏
i=1
1qi(D)+yi<zP[νi = yi]
1qk(D)+yk≥zP[νk = yk]P[λ = z] dy1...dyk dz
≤
∫
...
∫ k−1∏
i=1
1qi(D′)+yi<z+∆qP[νi = yi]
1qk(D)+yk≥zP[νk = yk]P[λ = z] dy1...dyk dz
The last step holds because |qi(D)− qi(D′)| ≤ ∆q, since qi(D) + yi < z, if q(D) ≥ q(D′) then qi(D′) + yi < z; if
q(D) < q(D′) then qi(D′) + yi < z + ∆q. So qi(D′) + yi is upper bounded by z + ∆q. Now we make a change of
variable z′ = z + ∆q , it yields
... =
∫
...
∫ k−1∏
i=1
1qi(D′)+yi<z′P[νi = yi]1qk(D)+yk≥z′−∆q
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P[νk = yk]P[λ = z′ −∆q]
∣∣∣∣dz′dz
∣∣∣∣dy1...dyk dz
=
∫
...
∫ k−1∏
i=1
1qi(D′)+yi<zP[νi = yi] dyi
1qk(D)+yk≥z−∆qP[νk = yk] dykP[λ = z −∆q] dz
≤
∫ ∫ k−1∏
i=1
Eνi
[
1qi(D′)+νi<z
]
1qk(D′)+yk≥z−2∆q
P[νk = yk]P[λ = z −∆q] dyk dz
=
∫ ∫ k−1∏
i=1
Eνi
[
1qi(D′)+νi<z
]
1qk(D′)+y′k≥z
P[νk = y′k − 2∆q]P[λ = z −∆q]
∣∣∣∣dy′dy
∣∣∣∣dyk dz
=
∫ ∫ k−1∏
i=1
Eνi
[
1qi(D′)+νi<z
]
1qk(D′)+yk≥z
P [νk = yk − 2∆q]P[λ = z −∆q] dyk dz (8)
The last inequality holds because |qk(D)−qk(D′)| ≤ ∆q , and one can get from qk(D)+yk ≥ z−∆q that qk(D′)+yk
is lower bounded by z − 2∆q . Follows it is another change of variable y′k = yk + 2∆q . For P(v, D′), we have
P(v, D′) =
∫ ∫ k−1∏
i=1
Eνi
[
1qi(D′)+νi<z
]
1qk(D′)+yk≥z
P[νk = yk]P[λ = z] dyk dz (9)
Let Λ(x;µ, λ) denote the pdf of the Laplace distribution with mean µ and scale λ; let f(x;µ, σ2) denote the pdf of the
Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ2. For convenience, define Hα for two probability distributions P and
Q with the same support as Hα := Ex∼Q[(P (x)/Q(x))α]. One can solve and find that
Hα
(
Lap(0, λ)‖Lap(µ, λ)) = ∫ Λ(x; 0, λ)αΛ(x;µ, λ)1−α dx
=
α
2α− 1 exp
(µ(α− 1)
λ
)
+
α− 1
2α− 1 exp
(−µα
λ
)
Hα
(N (0, σ2)‖N (µ, σ2)) = ∫ f(x; 0, σ2)αf(x;µ, σ2)1−α dx
= exp
(α(α− 1)µ2
2σ2
)
For Theorem 2, use (8) and (9),
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Hα
(
P(v, D)‖P(v, D′)) = Ev∼A(D′)[(P(v, D)/P(v, D′))α]
=
∫
...
∫
(
k−1∏
i=1
1qi(D)+yi<zP[νi = yi]1qk(D)+yk≥zP[νk = yk]P[λ = z]
)α
(
k−1∏
i=1
1qi(D′)+yi<zP[νi = yi]1qk(D′)+yk≥zP[νk = yk]P[λ = z]
)1−α
dy1...dyk dz
≤
∫
...
∫ k−1∏
i=1
1qi(D′)+yi<zP[νi = yi]1qk(D′)+yk≥z
[
Λ
(
yk; 0,
∆q
2
)α
Λ
(
yk; 2∆q,
∆q
2
)1−α]
[
Λ
(
yk; 0,
∆q
1
)α
Λ
(
yk; ∆q,
∆q
1
)1−α]
dy1...dyk dz
=
∫ ∫
Eνi
[
1qi(D′)+νi<z
]
1qk(D′)+yk≥z[
Λ
(
yk; 0,
∆q
2
)α
Λ
(
yk; 2∆q,
∆q
2
)1−α]
[
Λ
(
yk; 0,
∆q
1
)α
Λ
(
yk; ∆q,
∆q
1
)1−α]
dyk dz
=
[ α
2α− 1 exp
(2∆q(α− 1)
∆q/2
)
+
α− 1
2α− 1 exp
(−2∆qα
∆q/2
)]·
[ α
2α− 1 exp
(∆q(α− 1)
∆q/1
)
+
α− 1
2α− 1 exp
(−∆qα
∆q/1
)]
which yields the result of Theorem 2. For Theorem 3,
Hα
(
P(v, D)‖P(v, D′)) = Ev∼A(D′)[( P(v, D)P(v, D′)
)α]
≤
∫
...
∫ k−1∏
i=1
1qi(D′)+yi<zP[νi = yi]1qk(D′)+yk≥z[
f
(
yk; 0,∆
2
qσ
2
2
)α
f
(
yk; 2∆q,∆
2
qσ
2
2
)1−α]·[
f
(
yk; 0,∆
2
qσ
2
1
)α
f
(
yk; ∆q,∆
2
qσ
2
1
)1−α]
dy1...dyk dz
=
∫ ∫
Eνi
[
1qi(D′)+νi<z
]
1qk(D′)+yk≥z[
f
(
yk; 0,∆
2
qσ
2
2
)α
f
(
yk; 2∆q,∆
2
qσ
2
2
)1−α]·[
f
(
yk; 0,∆
2
qσ
2
1
)α
f
(
yk; ∆q,∆
2
qσ
2
1
)1−α]
dyk dz
= exp
(
α(α− 1)∆2q
2
( 4
∆2qσ
2
2
+
1
∆2qσ
2
1
))
which yields the result of Theorem 3.
C Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Since each data-dependent step is RDP, one can track the privacy budget at each iteration (Theorem 2 or 3 for
NOISYBTLS; noisy gradient is (α, αρgrad)-RDP), then use Lemma 4 to amplify for subsampling, and Lemma 3 to
calculate the overall privacy.
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